100 drones in one night: what the mass launches of "Shaheds" signify and what Ukraine should prepare for.

According to reports from the Air Forces, in recent days during their attacks, the Russian Armed Forces have been launching 60-100 "Shaheds" each night. Based on your information, what has caused the increase in launches?

If we look at the statistics, up until July, there were about 500-600 launches per month, with fluctuations of around 100 units. This correlated with information from the Russian Federation regarding their drone production and our intelligence data. By the beginning of 2024, they had ramped up production to 500 units per month, and by around June, this number increased to 600 drones per month.

When we provide our statistics, they include all types of UAVs that have been recorded. New to the mix are the so-called "Gerbers" — these are the younger siblings of the "Shaheds", which do not carry any combat payload and are designed to distract our air defense systems. These UAVs, "Gerbers", started being used from August 1 — the very first day marked their initial strike. We cannot differentiate them from "Shaheds", which is why they are included in the statistics. This also includes Russian UAVs known as "Parody", which also fly to divert attention.

Secondly, there are suspicions that additional reserves of "Shaheds" that could have been produced earlier have been utilized. There may also have been a shipment of drones from Iran, partially or fully assembled, as this happens from time to time. We receive information that cargo planes are arriving from Iran to Russia. What they are transporting, we do not know, and it is quite possible that some number of "Shaheds" were sourced from there. We cannot exclude the possibility that Russia has increased production or launched a new facility that we are not aware of.

Future launches will provide clarity. I have information from my military colleagues that as of October 27, about 1600 "Shaheds" and other UAVs have been launched — this is quite a large number. They may now be utilizing reserves (both hidden and visible) to exhaust our air defense system before a future attack on energy infrastructure. We have observed that there have been no large-scale missile strikes for over two months. This is not by chance — they are likely stockpiling missiles to strike energy targets at a time that is advantageous for them. The Russians are exhausting our air defense resources, knowing that they are not infinite.

Everyone can see that the number of "Shaheds" has increased. If in the middle of the year there were 600 per month, now it is 1400-1800, which is three times more. However, we do not observe that the number of targets hit has increased threefold. We would have heard about such cases if they had occurred. Yes, UAVs hit homes and some facilities, and unfortunately, people are dying, but we do not witness a total catastrophe.

This indicates that strike drones are being supplemented with devices that distract air defense. They do not carry a charge, they fall, and we find them in fields and forests. Therefore, there is no need to panic and claim that Russia has tripled the production of strike "Shaheds" and that disaster is imminent. For now, their goal is to diminish the potential of our air defense.

Can Ukraine learn to distinguish "Shaheds" from "Gerbers" and similar drones?

They differ in size, but not significantly. So, it is not guaranteed that air defense forces will be able to see them. They also have different sounds, as they are equipped with slightly different motors, which makes them acoustically distinguishable. However, from the perspective of a mobile fire group, especially in the dark, particularly when the target is illuminated by a spotlight, it is difficult to tell them apart.

There is one advantage. "Gerbers" have a short flight duration and fall relatively quickly when they run out of fuel. I cannot specify the flight range, as they use a polyethylene bag as a fuel tank, meaning there is no actual tank, although with such a capacity, a "Gerber" can easily fly half the country. A "Shahed" has a range of 1500-2000 km, allowing it to circle around all of Ukraine, fly to Western Ukraine, and return. A "Gerber" has a shorter range, but it is sufficient for us to record them throughout Ukraine — depending on where they are launched from.

The downside is that we do not fully understand what is flying, and we treat every object as a combat "Shahed". Naturally, the enemy achieves some of their objectives here; they specifically equip UAVs with elements called "Lüneburg lens". Visually, it looks like a ball, covered with foil on one side, and it is made in a special way. This ball can make the object appear larger to air defense systems — it seems bigger than it actually is.

If Russia is exhausting the air defense system, does Ukraine have enough resources to combat such a number of "Shaheds"? What level of resource deficit might arise before a missile attack?

The information regarding how many reserves the air defense system has is likely among our greatest secrets. We do not disclose it because the enemy must not know what our ammunition stockpile looks like. Ukraine still has three methods to combat "Shaheds": the use of electronic warfare systems, mobile fire groups that operate continuously, and air defense systems that expend missiles.

Naturally, we would prefer not to expend these missiles on "Shaheds," as it is clear that they aim to exhaust us. Therefore, we strive to maximize the use of mobile fire groups and apply air defense only in extreme cases when we perceive a threat from a drone to cities. For this, we analyze altitude, trajectory, flight tactics, and missiles are used only when absolutely necessary. This is a comprehensive methodology consisting of three parts.

What experiments is Russia conducting with "Shaheds" and what have they achieved?

The tactics for deploying "Shaheds" by our adversary have changed dramatically over the year. Now, UAVs have become complex weapons that can be programmed. The population of Ukraine has likely seen the circles that "Shaheds" trace in the sky. They change altitudes and tactics. Today, "Shaheds" fly in a column or in a V formation, tomorrow they disperse individually, at times all fly at an altitude of 4-5 km, then they fly very low at an altitude of 40-50 m, thus changing targets, and so forth.

All of this constitutes a complex chain of tactics in the deployment of "Shaheds," where our enemy experiments and seeks vulnerabilities. It is certainly quite challenging for us to counter this.

Today, the Russians demonstrated the launch of "Zala" and "Lanzet" from a boat in the Black Sea; I posted a video on my channel. There is information that they are conducting tests or serial launches of "Shaheds" from maritime platforms. In principle, there is nothing surprising about this; a launch installation is relatively easy to use, but it allows them to get closer to our shores.

Moreover, there is an enormous segment — a group working in Alabuga, where students from a polytechnic institute are engaged in experiments with "Shaheds", including with "Gerbers". This means they are equipping these "Shaheds" with additional devices to gain some advantages.

We have found video cameras and modems that operate on our LTE mobile networks. We have detected "Starlinks" and direct radio channels transmitting images from the Kursk region, directly through a video channel. They constantly attempt to attach something to "Shaheds" that could assist them, such as monitoring "exits" of our air defense and recording flashes indicating their locations. They are also observing fortified and unfortified objects. There have even been reports that they considered the idea of attaching some guided small missiles to a "Shahed," allowing it to perform additional tasks while flying.

They are experimenting with this and probing our capabilities, including in terms of operating within Ukrainian mobile communication networks. Our task is to counter this. I am part of a working group that addresses this issue. It is a complex process — because we cannot simply disconnect anyone and do whatever we want.

In this regard, students from Russia have been given a blank check. They can change SIM cards, can install three SIM cards, two modems, can use cards from other countries, add some trackers, and so forth. Therefore, where it is difficult for us, it is often easy for them. But we are trying to fight back.

There has also been information that Russian operators will be able to control "Shaheds" in real time through satellite systems, mobile systems, or Starlink. How realistic and effective is this, especially for strikes at long distances?

They can control them via Starlink, we understand that. However, while we can do something with mobile networks, it is challenging to counter Starlink without the help of SpaceX. Because Starlink operates in Ukrainian territory, and it is difficult to determine whose Starlink it is: ours or the enemy's, especially if purchased through a front account. It is clear that this is an expensive affair — buying Starlink for one-time strike UAVs, but for Russia, money