From patriotism to fatigue: how Ukrainians have transformed over three years of war and what lies ahead for society.

3 Years of War: From "Shock Euphoria" to "War is Here to Stay"

According to the sociologist, we can conditionally distinguish two periods of social change — from the beginning of the invasion to October-November 2023 (that is, 2022 and 2023) and from November-December 2023 to the present (primarily 2024).

"The main point is that in the first period, there was a 'rallying around the flag', mobilizing people to fight against the enemy, or, as Yevhen Holovakha described it, 'shock euphoria'. Ukraine withstood the first wave of the invasion, repelled the attack on Kyiv, which the enemy planned to capture in 3 days, garnering surprise and respect worldwide, achieved success in liberating occupied territories, and awaited a future counteroffensive that was widely discussed in the media and social networks. There was an expectation that the war would soon end in our victory," says Paniotto.

The second period began when it became clear that the counteroffensive was at least not meeting expectations, and to be frank, it turned out to be unsuccessful, with the realization that the war would not end anytime soon and that we were talking about years rather than months. We transitioned from a quick war to a positional war, a war of attrition, and Russia has a vast amount of resources. Society had to come to terms with the fact that the war is here to stay, and the prospects of regaining all occupied territories now seem dubious.

The Start of the War: How Ukrainians United

Rallying or unification around the flag ("rally around the flag") refers to the mobilization of the population around the leader and the country's leadership in very difficult situations, especially during wartime (a concept used by American political scientists).

"The situation regarding attitudes towards the state and social institutions appears rather paradoxical. After the war began, the standard of living in Ukraine significantly decreased, poverty levels rose, unemployment surged, yet the assessment of the situation improved. Two months before the war, in November 2021, only 5% believed that central government bodies were fulfilling their duties; by December 2022, that number had risen to 41%. The same trend applies to assessments of Ukraine's future. Before the war, Ukrainians were quite pessimistic — 35% believed that the situation would likely worsen, while only 13% thought it would improve. By December 2022, the number of pessimists had decreased from 35% to 8%, while the number of optimists astonishingly increased to 76%," continues the sociologist.

The Armed Forces gained the highest level of trust in Ukraine, with trust levels rising from 72% to 96% in the first year of the war.

According to Paniotto, in December 2021, 27% trusted the President (with a negative balance of -23%, meaning there were more people who did not trust him than those who did), but within a year (by December 2022), this figure rose to 84%, and the balance became +80%.

After the war began, trust in volunteers also grew, and perceptions of the Government and Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) significantly improved.

"In general, it can be said that the possibility of losing statehood forced Ukrainians to reevaluate their pre-war views. Ukrainians began to value their state much more. The comparison of democratic Ukraine with totalitarian Russia made them appreciate their sovereignty, freedom, and citizens' rights more. The war fosters national unity against a common enemy. This sense of unity and common purpose leads to an increase in patriotism and pride in one’s country and state. What once seemed like shortcomings now appears attractive and is perceived as valuable and important in comparison to the war. Successful resistance against Russia, despite all difficulties, strengthens national pride and faith in the state’s capabilities," says Paniotto.

Ukraine has made a definitive and irreversible geopolitical choice — the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians support joining the EU and NATO, both nationwide and across all regions of Ukraine.

Attitudes of Ukrainians towards the Russian Federation, which had significantly worsened back in 2014 after the occupation of Crimea, have deteriorated even further: the percentage of supporters of Russia has dropped to 2%. Attitudes towards Russian citizens have also sharply declined, falling from 75% (in 2021) to just 3% positive sentiment. Similar changes occurred in attitudes towards Belarus, which most Ukrainians consider a participant in the war.

The war has contributed to the unification of the nation, increased social cohesion, Ukrainian identity, use of the Ukrainian language, and enhanced patriotism and pride for the country. Levels of mutual aid, trust in volunteers, and the prevalence of volunteer activities have risen. Regional and linguistic-ethnic differentiation has significantly decreased.

"The process of forming a Ukrainian national identity has accelerated, demonstrating dynamic growth and deep penetration into various aspects of public life, from strengthening citizens' self-identification as Ukrainians to rethinking historical legacies and cultural influences. For instance, the percentage of citizens who identify primarily as citizens of Ukraine rose from 40% during the period of 1992-2004 to 80% after the war began in 2022-2023. The popularity of state holidays has increased, support for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) has grown, and attitudes towards OUN- UPA have improved," continues the sociologist.

Among the negative trends, new potential sources of social tension have emerged, particularly a new basis for social differentiation — the status and behavior of individuals during the war. Potential social conflicts could arise among different groups of Ukrainians, including refugees abroad, internally displaced persons, the local population that has not changed residence, and those who lived in occupied territories. Attitudes towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians have also worsened.

"War is Here to Stay": Who is to Blame for the Panic Among Ukrainians

As the "shock euphoria" faded and it became clear that the war was dragging on, Ukrainians no longer flocked to the TCC voluntarily; the term "draft dodger" began to be heard more frequently, followed by "busification." News emerged of Ukrainian men attempting to cross the country's borders by any means, even risking their lives — whether through the Tisza River or over snowy mountains into Romania.

"Although after the unsuccessful counteroffensive and the realization that the war is here to stay, optimism has declined. It is also important to note that there has been a significant resurgence in political struggle. I don't know who is more to blame for this — the authorities or the opposition — but politicians have largely ceased to hold back, which has diminished the unity of our society and made it more vulnerable to hostile information operations. This includes unconstructive criticism of the authorities in a situation where elections cannot be held and cannot be changed. There are calls for immediate elections. Isolated cases of absurd actions by the TCC are inflated and create the impression of widespread statistical occurrences. The media and social networks, particularly Telegram channels, spread panic sentiments. Of course, after three years of war, almost everyone who wanted to join the army voluntarily has already done so, but the majority of men of conscription age (and many women) are ready to join the Armed Forces if called," says Volodymyr Paniotto.

Moreover, according to an international study by Gallup at the end of 2023, the willingness of Ukrainians to defend their country (62%) is twice as high as in Russia (32%) and in major European countries — Spain (29%), Germany (23%), Austria (20%), Italy (14%).

Data from sociological studies do not confirm a significant deterioration in the situation. Firstly, some indicators have hardly changed and are unlikely to change in the future. This primarily concerns geopolitical orientations, attitudes towards Russia and Russians, orientation towards Europe, and attitudes towards NATO. Additionally, regional, ethnic, and linguistic differentiation has significantly diminished or disappeared in some respects in Ukraine. Secondly, changes in other indicators are not sharp but gradual and slow.

"Indeed, the 'rallying around the flag' has largely come to an end, and attitudes towards the government, parliament, and the judicial system have returned to pre-war levels. Trust in the president has also decreased, but it remains at an unprecedentedly high level for Ukrainian presidents. In our survey in December, 52% trusted Zelensky, 39% did not trust him, with a balance of +13%, while before the war the balance was -15%," explains the sociologist.

If during the first two years of the full-scale invasion, 72% were willing to endure the war for as long as necessary (with those willing for less than six months at 18-20% in various surveys), in the last year, that percentage has decreased to 57% (with those willing for less than six months at 21%, as of December 2024). Despite the heavy war and constant shelling, the majority of the population is ready to endure the war for as long as necessary.

The level of happiness over the past year (from December 2023 to December 2024) decreased from 69% to 58%, but not due to an increase